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LAW AND NONLEGAL NORMS 
IN GOVERNMENT LAWYERS’ ETHICS:  
DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY 
W. Bradley Wendel* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is about the role of unwritten norms in the ethical decision-
making of government lawyers.  Because the ethical obligations of lawyers, 
including government lawyers, are closely tied to the legal rights and 
obligations of clients,1 this analysis necessarily depends on understanding the 
relationship between written law and unwritten norms.2  As we all know, 
however, written law leaves gaps, ambiguities, and zones of unregulated 
discretion.  Prosecutors in the United States, for example, have virtually 
unreviewable discretion to decide who to investigate and charge, what 
charges to bring, and whether to offer immunity in exchange for cooperation.  
No one has a legal entitlement not to be prosecuted, nor does anyone else—
official or private citizen—have the power to compel a prosecutor to bring 
charges.3  The president possesses nearly unconstrained discretion to grant 
clemency to people convicted of criminal offenses.4  The impeachment 
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Ethics on October 12, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the 
Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1791 (2019). 
 
 1. I have argued this elsewhere and will not reargue it here. See generally W. BRADLEY 
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers 
in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275 (2017).  However, readers who believe 
that the government lawyer’s ethical role ought to have something to do with the public 
interest, justice, or the common good—not just the entitlements allocated to citizens by 
positive law—may wish to rely on unwritten norms of democratic governance to support their 
view.  My hope is that this Essay has something new to contribute to that discussion. 
 2. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 
(2018); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1797. 
 3. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 
1973); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 4. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated on many occasions that the president’s power to 
grant pardons, conferred by Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, is not subject to 
review or modification by Congress. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974); Ex 
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 
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power of Congress is constrained only by the Constitution’s requirement that 
the president be charged with certain enumerated offenses, including the 
open-ended phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”5  In other areas, a 
government official may possess the legal authority to do something but may 
nevertheless be criticized for exercising that authority contrary to standards 
that are not reducible to positive law.  For example, Jack Goldsmith argues 
that Trump’s revocation of the security clearance of former CIA Director 
John Brennan was “within the president’s power but also was an abuse of 
power.”6  That criticism implies that there are extralegal norms that 
government officials should consider even when they act within an area of 
clearly authorized discretion. 
The question is, what standards, norms, or ethical values, if any, constrain 
the actions of lawyers advising government officials who exercise their 
power within discretionary unwritten areas of the law?  In other words, is 
there a type of official discretion that is distinguishable from the exercise of 
raw power or whimsical decision-making, despite being unconstrained by 
positive law?  If so, what is its relationship to positive law and its claim to 
legitimate authority?  This question is a jurisprudential one rather than a 
consideration of official discretion from the point of view of the history of 
constitutional law.  The claim to be defended in this Essay is that the value 
of legality—that is, a political ideal aimed at safeguarding against abuses of 
power, which emphasizes a relationship of mutual respect between citizens 
and those who govern—informs the exercise of discretion in the spaces left 
unregulated by positive law.7  It is offered in a time in which the president 
 
(1866); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).  See generally JEFFREY 
CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009); P. E. DIGESER, POLITICAL FORGIVENESS 
(2001); KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:  JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
(1989); Robert L. Ehrlich, Pardons and Commutations:  Observations from the Front Lines, 
9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 669 (2013); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency 
Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561 (2001); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:  
Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991); Harold J. Krent, 
Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (2001); 
Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons:  Reflections on the 
President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000); Elizabeth Rapaport, 
Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1501 (2000); Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors:  Legal Accountability 
and the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (1993); Mark Strasser, The 
Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 
41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85 (2002). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 6. Jack Goldsmith, The Dangers in the Trump-Brennan Confrontation, LAWFARE (Aug. 
20, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dangers-trump-brennan-confrontation 
[https://perma.cc/D3T6-AWDH]. 
 7. This argument is influenced by Jeremy Waldron’s thinking about the rule of law, 
although to my knowledge Waldron has not expressed a view regarding legality in the absence 
of positive law. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Waldron, Concept]; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the 
Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 3 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter Waldron, Procedure]; Jeremy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, 18 
BRIT. ACAD. REV. 1, 7 (2011). 
2019] DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY 1997 
and his allies are keen to collapse any distinction between law and power.8  
It is an appeal to government lawyers to understand, as a matter of 
professional ethics, that they have a duty to contribute to the fair and 
reasonable administration of state power. 
One may be tempted to say that if positive law does not regulate the 
exercise of official discretion, then this power is outside the constraints of the 
rule of law.  Gerald Ford famously defined an impeachable offense as nothing 
more than whatever a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives 
says it is.9  That is too much of a concession to legal realism.  The argument 
in this Essay is, instead, that government officials and the lawyers who advise 
them may have substantial law-conferred discretion to include nonlegal 
considerations among the grounds for their decisions.  In those incompletely 
law-governed domains, official decision makers must nevertheless respect 
the cluster of values associated with the rule of law.  The rule of law restricts 
the type of considerations that can be taken into account and the way they are 
weighed and balanced in deliberation.  To put it informally, not just any 
reasons can justify a decision.  Grants of executive clemency customarily 
state that they are based on “good and sufficient reasons.”10  This formulation 
implies that an exercise of the pardon power may be abusive if it was not 
based on good and sufficient reason.  For example, I believe that many share 
the intuition that there is a difference between the well-exercised prerogative 
of executive clemency to grant a reduction in sentence to prisoners serving 
lengthy prison terms for drug possession offenses and the corruption of that 
power, as critics asserted concerning President Bill Clinton’s pardon of 
financier (and campaign contributor, through his ex-wife) Marc Rich.11  The 
 
 8. As was the case during the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, when the George 
W. Bush administration aggressively asserted unchecked executive power, critics of the 
Trump administration are once again citing Carl Schmitt’s conception of unreviewable 
sovereignty. See, e.g., Quinta Jurecic, Donald Trump’s Pardon Power and the State of 
Exception, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/donald-
trumps-pardon-power-and-state-exception [https://perma.cc/WA9Z-BBU8].  For discussion 
of Schmittian themes in the Bush (43) years, see, for example, Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699 (2006); and 
David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457 
(2010). 
 9. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 348–49 
(2010). 
 10. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 
281, 281 (1993).  Similarly, in a discussion of draft evasion, Ronald Dworkin wrote that 
prosecutorial discretion “is not license—we expect prosecutors to have good reasons for 
exercising it.” RONALD DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206, 207 
(1977). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, The Clinton Pardons:  The Democrats; This Time, 
Clintons Find Their Support Buckling from Weight of New Woes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/23/us/clinton-pardons-democrats-this-time-clintons-find-
their-support-buckling-weight.html [https://perma.cc/F2K5-8WD5]; Timothy M. Phelps, 
Justice Department Plans for Wave of Crack-Cocaine Clemency Requests, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 
21, 2014, 9:36 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-holder-clemency-
petitions-20140421-story.html [https://perma.cc/6M9W-SCXM] (describing Justice 
Department clemency guidelines intended to aid prisoners sentenced before 2010, when new 
sentencing guidelines came into effect that reduced disparities in sentences for possession of 
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former exercise of the pardon power is backed by a good and sufficient 
reason, albeit one not grounded in positive law, while the latter is not.  
Similarly, one might contend that revoking the security clearance of a 
political opponent who is exercising his First Amendment right to criticize 
the president is not an action based on a good and sufficient reason, even 
though the president otherwise has the right to revoke security clearances.12 
That is the right way to think about the norms and values that inform the 
role of government lawyers but, of course, a great deal rides on how “good 
and sufficient reason” is defined.  One might contend, in line with natural 
law theorists, that legal officials are necessarily charged with an obligation 
of care for the common good of the community.13  Under this conception of 
legal authority, an official decision that is contrary to the common good is an 
abuse of the discretion afforded by law.  One very influential strand of 
thinking about the value of lawyer professionalism emphasizes the social role 
of lawyers in mediating between the interests of individual clients and the 
common good.14  Some scholars continue to maintain that lawyers have a 
responsibility to identify and promote the public interest in the course of their 
representation of clients, whether public or private.15  On this account, a good 
and sufficient reason for the exercise of legally conferred discretion would 
be one that promotes the public interest.  In the pardon example, reducing 
excessive sentences imposed on (partially and to some extent unconsciously) 
 
crack and powder cocaine).  Rich’s company, a commodities trading firm based in 
Switzerland, was investigated for tax evasion and obstruction of justice beginning in the early 
1980s. See Susan F. Jennison, Comment, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client 
Privilege:  Marc Rich and the Second Circuit, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 920–29 (1985).  
Controversy over Clinton’s pardon decision was renewed during the 2016 presidential election 
campaign when the FBI released a number of documents related to the pardon of Rich, who 
had died in 2013, a few days after then–FBI Director James Comey announced that the FBI 
was investigating new emails possibly related to Hillary Clinton’s private server, which she 
employed while serving as Secretary of State. See Jessica Taylor, More Surprises:  FBI 
Releases Files on Bill Clinton’s Pardon of Marc Rich, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016, 8:55 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500297580/more-surprises-fbi-releases-files-on-bill-
clintons-pardon-of-marc-rich [https://perma.cc/XB2V-LM4T]. 
 12. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Trump Revokes Ex-C.I.A. Director 
John Brennan’s Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/08/15/us/politics/john-brennan-security-clearance.html [https://perma.cc/EW6R-
RBCV]. 
 13. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS (William P. 
Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan, eds., Richard J. Regan trans., 2d ed. 2002); CICERO, ON 
DUTIES (Walter Miller trans., 1913); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154–
56 (1980); MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 85–90 (2006). 
 14. See, e.g., Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism:  Julius Henry Cohen and the 
Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 45–46 (2012) (describing 
the position of Durkheim and Parsons on the relationship between professionals, clients, and 
the common good). 
 15. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State:  Reflections 
on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006).  
In later work with Eli Wald, Pearce has advocated for a “relational” approach to law practice, 
in which lawyers advise clients to take account of the well-being of others. See generally Eli 
Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers:  A Relational Approach to Law Practice, 
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601 (2016). 
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racially discriminatory grounds would plausibly be in furtherance of the 
public good, while pardoning one’s wealthy crony and benefactor would not. 
This Essay offers an alternative version of the public-interest criterion for 
judging the sufficiency of reasons for official action in the exercise of 
discretion.  Building on H. L. A. Hart’s recently rediscovered essay on 
discretion,16 this Essay will argue that positive law is not the only source of 
constraint for government lawyers.  However, this additional guidance is not 
provided by substantive conceptions of the public interest, but by a more 
formal, procedural value of legality.  This contention sounds like a 
paradoxical claim—the ideal of the rule of law informs the role of lawyers 
even when there are gaps or ambiguities in positive law—but it is not 
paradoxical when understood as a claim within the political ethics of the 
lawyer’s role rather than a thesis about the nature of law.17  A government 
lawyer, in particular, occupies a social role that is directly connected with the 
task of ruling the members of a political community pursuant to a claim of 
legitimate authority.18 
The idea of legitimacy is very important here.  As Hart emphasizes, the 
discretion exercised by government officials is not the same as 
unconstrained, unregulated choice.19  Discretion is choice in terms of 
considerations that bear on what is appropriate to be done.  It is, in principle, 
 
 16. See generally H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013); Geoffrey C. 
Shaw, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay:  Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 666 (2013).  Shaw’s paper situates Hart’s “Discretion” essay within the intellectual 
context of the then quite influential legal process school associated with Henry Hart (no 
relation), Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller.  As mentioned above, I have argued for a conception 
of legal ethics that is closely tied to the rights and obligations assigned by positive law to the 
lawyer’s client. See supra note 1.  Engagement with (mostly sympathetic) critics of my 
position has forced a reckoning with the source of guidance for lawyers where there are gaps 
or ambiguities in positive law.  The legal process school has proven to be full of insights for 
dealing with this issue, and I have written papers of various lengths trying to incorporate legal 
process thinking into positivist legal ethics. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, The Limits of 
Positivist Legal Ethics:  A Brief History, a Critique, and a Return to Foundations, 30 
CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 443 (2017); W. Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal-Process 
Reasons in Attorney Advising, 99 B.U. L. REV. 107 (2019). 
 17. See Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality:  Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2008) (noting the reluctance of legal philosophers to consider 
Fuller’s critique of Hart on its own terms because to do so would “open the boundaries 
between legal and political philosophy and complicate our sense of the separability of law and 
morality”).  The use of Hart here is an intentional bit of irony, since he is generally taken as 
the poster child for legal positivism.  Reliance on the “Discretion” essay is meant to show that 
some of Hart’s views are not far from one of his rivals in jurisprudence, Lon Fuller. 
 18. See JOHN RAWLS, Reply to Habermas, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 372, 427–28 (1993); 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 71–80 (1986).  I am using the concept of legitimacy 
throughout this Essay and not the closely related notions of authority and obligation.  The 
focus of the Essay is what considerations bear on decisions of government officials in areas 
of legally conferred discretion.  In some cases, the officials purport to impose obligations on 
citizens, but the core instances of official discretion, such as pardoning and decisions by 
prosecutors to bring charges, involve not the demand for obedience but the application or 
removal of coercive state power.  Thus, it seems more natural to talk in terms of legitimacy as 
the rightful application (or withdrawal) of coercive force. See generally Richard Dagger, 
Authority, Legitimacy, and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 24 LEGAL THEORY 77 (2018). 
 19. Hart, supra note 16, at 656 (distinguishing discretion from “choice (tout court)”). 
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possible to justify an exercise of discretion and conclude that it was sound.20  
So why not call upon government lawyers to justify their choices with 
reference to beliefs about what would serve the public interest?  The fear 
expressed by many critics of appeals to unwritten law—which would apply 
here to the appeal to unwritten norms of good governance—is that nothing 
will prevent officials from making decisions on the basis of mere preferences, 
unconstrained by any reliable disciplining methodology.21  The discretion 
exercised by government officials, and the lawyers who advise them, must 
be justified in terms of principles that bear the appropriate relationship with 
the ascription of legitimacy, which is to say the right to issue directives that 
carry an obligation of obedience. 
I.  LEGITIMACY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
The idea that the lawyer’s role is to act in the public interest when there is 
room for the exercise of discretion tacitly relies upon a conception of legal 
legitimacy with an ancient lineage.  This is the assumption that “there is a 
good for humankind that can be realized only in a society ruled by those who 
know what that good is and how to pursue it.”22  Stating that assumption goes 
a long way toward refuting the public interest view of the lawyer’s role.  
Lawyers in general do not have privileged access to knowledge of the 
common good and how to pursue it, even if a few “lawyer-statesmen” with 
long experience in government and private practice may have acquired 
considerable practical wisdom concerning “the public good” and “the 
limitations of human beings and their political arrangements.”23  In general, 
however, lawyers in government service today do not see themselves as 
having particular expertise in human affairs beyond their technical 
competence in legal analysis.  Most observers would agree that the 
nineteenth-century ideal of the legal profession mediating between the 
interests of individuals and the common good has long since given way to a 
more technocratic vision of lawyers as market actors who provide legal 
services as desired by clients.24  One might therefore argue that in an area of 
 
 20. Id. at 657 (giving the excruciatingly middle-class English example of choice as 
between having a martini or a sherry, but acknowledging that discretion might be involved if 
it appealed to rational standards, for example, “I have found from experience that I get on 
better when I drink [a martini] rather than sherry, I don’t talk so much”). 
 21. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So 
Help Me God:  Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1389 
(2014).  See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks 
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987). 
 22. See Richard E. Flathman, Legitimacy, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 678, 678 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
 23. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 12 (1993). 
 24. See generally Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 649 (2016).  Russ Pearce and others seeking to revitalize civic republicanism as an 
alternative to what they take as an excessively individual-centered, adversarial legal ethics of 
political liberalism often talk in terms of the common good of the political community. See, 
e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992); see also STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & 
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legally conferred discretion, the lawyer’s role is simply to acquiesce in 
whatever the relevant government officials wish to do as a matter of policy, 
politics, or even personal preference.  But this assumes that the political-
ethical role of government lawyer carries only responsibilities with respect 
to positive law, not to governance more generally.25  Where the law confers 
discretion, the ideal of the rule of law may impose additional ethical 
requirements upon government lawyers. 
To better understand the problem, one might follow Hart in asking why a 
legal system should tolerate discretion at all.  Hart’s answer is, quite bluntly, 
“we are men not gods.”26  Any method of governing a community must 
contend with certain limitations connected with the bounded rationality of 
human beings; these are the “Relative Ignorance of Fact” and the “Relative 
Indeterminacy of Aim.”27  The first factor, that we cannot know in advance 
all the circumstances in which the application of a rule would arise, is a 
familiar reason for the open-endedness of legal standards.28  There will 
always be borderline cases we could not have anticipated.  It may be possible 
 
COMMUNITARIANS 220–21 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying classical republicanism with a 
conception of the good of a political community that emphasizes the active participation of 
citizens possessed of civic virtue).  In jurisprudence, the common good is generally 
encountered in connection with the natural law thesis that “the law’s reason-giving power 
flows from the common good of the political community.” MURPHY, supra note 13, at 61. 
 25. I have argued that the primary ethical obligation of lawyers, whether representing 
clients in the private sector or serving as legal advisors to government officials, is to promote 
the legal entitlements of clients, as opposed to furthering their prelegal interests. See generally 
WENDEL, supra note 1.  Exhibiting fidelity to law in the representation of clients is a bedrock 
duty of lawyers.  However, I did not mean to deny that lawyers may have other responsibilities 
under some circumstances. 
 26. Hart, supra note 16, at 661. 
 27. See id. at 661–63.  Hart’s two examples of the way in which humans are not gods 
bears striking resemblance to Rawls’s burdens of judgment (i.e., the sources of disagreement 
among reasonable persons). See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 55–58.  Hart’s discussion of the 
dinner party hostess example refers to a number of factors distinguishing her exercise of 
discretion from a mere choice; many of these factors overlap with the burdens of judgment, 
including the lack of a clear principle to determine the ranking or relative importance of 
constitutive values and the inability to define the aim specifically enough to prescribe 
necessary means for achieving it. See Hart, supra note 16, at 659–60.  Rawls introduces the 
ideas of public reason and an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines in the course of analyzing the legitimacy of the basic structure of society.  There is 
a proceduralist strand of Rawls’s later views, discussed in his debate with Habermas, which 
connects the burdens of judgment with the need for legitimate procedures:  “A legitimate 
procedure is one that all may reasonably accept as free and equal when collective decisions 
must be made and agreement is normally lacking.  The burdens of judgment lead to that even 
with reason and good will on all sides.” RAWLS, supra note 18, at 428–29.  Rawls 
acknowledges that procedures may be “purely procedural with respect to legitimacy” but if 
laws are too unjust, they are not legitimate. Id. at 429. 
 28. Hart, supra note 16, at 662.  Hart later developed these arguments in chapter seven of 
The Concept of Law, where he explained why the open texture of legal language made legal 
formalism impossible. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (2d ed. 1994).  An 
important observation from this later work is that formalism seeks to minimize or disguise the 
need for discretion. Id. at 129.  But Hart warns against the attitude of rule-skepticism, which 
is the antithesis of mechanical jurisprudence; the area of open texture is circumscribed, and 
while there is some uncertainty at the margin of the application of rules, every rule also has a 
core of settled meaning. See id. at 138, 145–47. 
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to find common factors running through diverse situations and to formulate 
a rule in advance based on the anticipated facts, but experience shows that 
these rules often collide with novel facts that could not have been anticipated 
ex ante.29  Regarding the second factor, to say a decision calls for discretion 
is to presuppose that it involves a situation in which there is no clearly 
definable aim, no clear standards of right and wrong.  And while there may 
be constitutive values or elements that bear on the decision, there is no 
higher-order principle determining how these values are to be ranked or 
harmonized if they conflict.30  Thus, it is a conceptual impossibility that our 
lawmakers and law-appliers can serve as platonic guardians who know what 
is good for society and how to pursue it. 
To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical example of a relatively 
senior career agency lawyer—not a political appointee—working in the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.  Two grocery store chains in 
the northeastern United States have proposed a merger.  However, the 
hypothetical current president ran as a populist and an enemy of concentrated 
corporate power, corruption, and monopolies.  During her campaign she was 
fond of quoting Theodore Roosevelt:  “The great corporations . . . are the 
creatures of the State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but 
it is duty bound to control them wherever the need of such control is 
shown.”31  She recently gave an interview in which she objected to the 
merger on the ground that it would harm local businesses.  “Bigger is not 
always better when it comes to business,” the president said.  The lawyer is 
horrified.  He is a staunch believer in the economic approach to antitrust law 
that aims at protecting competition, not competitors.  Judge Learned Hand 
once wrote, “It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to 
prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his 
own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must 
accept the direction of a few.”32  In the lawyer’s judgment, however, Hand’s 
approach is outmoded and the wrong way to understand the goals of antitrust 
law.  After extensive reading and reflection, he has been persuaded by the 
arguments of then-Professor Robert Bork: 
Hand’s notion, moreover, is dubious, and indeed radical, social policy.  It 
would be hard to demonstrate that the independent druggist or groceryman 
is any more solid and virtuous a citizen than the local manager of a chain 
operation.  The notion that such persons are entitled to special consideration 
by the state is an ugly demand for class privilege.  It hardly seems suited to 
the United States, whose dominant ideal, though doubtless too often flouted 
in legislative practice, has been that each business should survive only by 
serving consumers as they want to be served.33 
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The question is, put simply, what the lawyer should do with his views 
about economic policy.  Suppose the lawyer is highly experienced and 
knowledgeable about antitrust law and the government’s enforcement 
practices.  The lawyer reasonably believes that an unequivocal statement in 
support of the merger by senior agency lawyers would take some of the wind 
out of the president’s opposition to it.  The lawyer also is a savvy enough 
operator to understand available strategies of resistance—not full-blown, 
open disobedience,34 but bureaucratic techniques like papering the file to 
death, placing the matter on a low-priority schedule, or leaking details about 
internal opposition to friendly journalists. 
To answer this question, consider the values and obligations on both sides.  
On the side of supporting the merger (that is, opposing the president) are not 
just the lawyer’s “personal” beliefs and commitments.  There is an 
unfortunate tendency when talking about ethics to assert the lawyer’s 
position regarding ethical obligations as a matter of personal subjective 
beliefs about the common good.  The lawyer in the hypothetical, however, 
believes that the common good would in fact be furthered by interpreting 
antitrust statutes to promote competition rather than to protect competitors.  
On the other side, however, is the president’s position about what would be 
in the public interest.35  The seeming impasse between the two positions is 
resolved, however, by the existence of procedures for determining, at least 
for present purposes, the content of the public interest.  The tiebreaker, so to 
speak, is the legitimacy of the decision.36 
Hart’s argument, that discretion is inevitable because of normative 
pluralism and bounded rationality, is not the only explanation for creating 
legally sanctioned zones of discretion.  Picking up on the distinction between 
rules and standards in legal reasoning,37 one might contend instead that 
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discretion is intended to shift power from the judiciary to government 
officials in the executive branch.  There is a vast scholarly literature on 
political-branch interpretation of the constitution and statutory law.38  
Significantly, the debate pertains to the identity of the institutional actor who 
should be charged with responsibility for reaching a conclusion about the 
proper interpretation of the law.  Descriptively speaking, it may be the case 
that the president’s power has increased as effective checks have eroded, 
either from the judiciary or from intrabranch sources of constraint.39  Bruce 
Ackerman’s 2010 book on presidential power,40 dismissed by some as 
alarmist,41 now seems prescient in the Trump years.  Ackerman made these 
arresting predictions: 
I predict that:  (1) the evolving system of presidential nominations will 
lead to the election of an increasing number of charismatic outsider types 
who gain office by mobilizing activist support for extremist programs of 
the left or the right; (2) all presidents, whether extremist or mainstream, 
will rely on media consultants to design streams of sound bites aimed at 
narrowly segmented micropublics, generating a politics of unreason that 
will often dominate public debate; (3) they will increasingly govern 
through their White House staff of superloyalists, issuing executive orders 
that their staffers will impose on the federal bureaucracy even when they 
conflict with congressional mandates; (4) they will engage with an 
increasingly politicized military in ways that may greatly expand their 
effective power to put their executive orders into force throughout the 
nation; (5) they will legitimate their unilateral actions through an expansive 
use of emergency powers, and (6) assert “mandates from the People” to 
evade or ignore congressional statutes when public opinion polls support 
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decisive action; (7) they will rely on elite lawyers in the executive branch 
to write up learned opinions that vindicate the constitutionality of their most 
blatant power grabs.42 
The seventh prediction is the aspect of this dystopian vision—arguably being 
played out daily—that concerns lawyers, legal ethics, and jurisprudence.  
And the concern of this paper in particular is what distinguishes a “blatant 
power grab[]” from the rightful exercise of power. 
II.  LEGITIMACY AS REASON-GIVING 
Power exercised without respect for the principle of legality lacks 
legitimacy and authority.43  The president may be able to do something, but 
that alone does not mean it is a rightful exercise of power.  In The Concept 
of Law, Hart famously distinguished the command of a gunman—“hand over 
your money or I’ll shoot”—from an utterance that creates a genuine 
obligation.44  The rightful (that is, legitimate) exercise of power is justified 
by reasons that its subjects can endorse from their perspective as free and 
equal.  That is the significance of the passage quoted above, which connects 
the dignity of people who live under the law with the requirement that lawful 
authority be backed by reasons that are not reducible to a threat of 
punishment.  Hart went on to give an elaborate theoretical account of one 
way in which lawful authority can be exercised—namely, through a system 
of primary and secondary rules in which there is a rule of recognition, 
accepted as a standard by legal officials, specifying criteria of legal validity.45  
This is, of course, a paradigm case of a theory of legal positivism.46  But it 
would be a mistake to view Hart’s focus on positive law as the only way to 
connect the moral conception of people as free and equal bearers of dignity 
with the political ideal that official power should be exercised in ways that 
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respect the dignity of citizens.47  Indeed, as Hart himself well understood, to 
say something is a law according to the criteria of validity of a legal system’s 
rule of recognition is not yet to give a reason that the law ought to be 
obeyed.48  In his debate with Lon Fuller, Hart faulted German lawyers during 
the Nazi era for failing to observe the distinction between legal validity and 
authority.49 
The rule of law depends not only on positive law to establish a substantive 
position, in the name of society as a whole, regarding public policy issues.  
The law also presents itself to its subjects as a rational basis for establishing 
order, as opposed to the arbitrary commands of a ruler, and as a means of 
facilitating participation and democratic self-government.50  To insist upon 
the reasonableness of law and its administration is to acknowledge the 
rational agency and dignity of the citizens of a political community: 
[L]aw has a dignitarian aspect:  it conceives of the people who live under 
it as bearers of reason and intelligence.  They are thinkers who can grasp 
and grapple with the rationale of the way they are governed and relate it in 
complex but intelligible ways to their own view of the relation between 
their actions and purposes and the actions and purposes of the state.51 
The central insight here is that the law’s function for its subjects, as free and 
equal, reasonable agents, is to promote their flourishing—one aspect of 
which is a mutually beneficial social order.52  As John Finnis puts it, the 
question for the subjects of law is, what is the significance, from the point of 
view of practical reasonableness, of the fact that a political authority has 
stated that something shall be done?  The answer turns on the “importance of 
law as a specific way of realizing a fundamental element of the common 
good, viz. a fair, predictable, positively collaborative, and flexibly stable 
order of human interrelationships.”53 
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Again, it is worth emphasizing Hart’s awareness that the criteria for the 
existence of a legal system (general obedience of valid law plus acceptance, 
from the internal point of view, of the rule of recognition by officials)54 are 
one thing, and the conditions for legal legitimacy are another.  Hart 
acknowledges that the allegiance of citizens to a legal system may have 
diverse grounds, including considerations of long-term self-interest, altruism, 
conformity, or unthinking adherence to tradition.55  A society characterized 
by “deplorably sheeplike” attitudes on the part of its members may 
nevertheless have valid law.56  From this, however, it does not follow that 
people subject to the requirements of valid law have a moral obligation of 
obedience.57  The rightful exercise of power, and a corresponding obligation 
on the part of its subjects, requires something beyond the existence of a legal 
system.  Being clear on what this “something else” is can therefore shed 
needed light on the nature of the ethical obligations of government officials 
and their legal advisors. 
The political ideal of the rule of law informs the obligation of both lawyers 
and the government officials with whom they interact.  The lawyer in our 
antitrust hypothetical does have a reasoned basis for supporting the merger 
and opposing the president.  The problem is simply that the president has a 
different reasoned basis, and in our constitutional structure, the president’s 
view is entitled to prevail.  That is a relatively easy case.  The more difficult 
ethical issue arises in a situation in which the president, or another high-
ranking government official, directs a lawyer to assist in doing something 
that is within the official’s discretion.  For example, suppose the president 
directs an investigation or prosecution of a political opponent58 or grants a 
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pardon to a campaign contributor or a political ally.  For the principle of 
legality to inform the duties of government officials and lawyers, it must have 
something to do not only with the making and interpretation of positive law, 
but with the exercise of power in zones of legally conferred discretion.  Apart 
from the specific requirements of positive law, the dignitarian aspects of the 
rule of law require that official power be exercised according to reasons that 
are related to the good of a “fair, predictable, positively collaborative, and 
flexibly stable order of human interrelationships.”59 
Lawyers can promote fairness, predictability, and stability indirectly by 
participating in processes that promote reasoned, nonarbitrary, and hence 
legitimate decisions by government officials.60  As Waldron notes, 
influential conceptions of the rule of law tend to emphasize certainty, 
predictability, and the determinacy of public norms.61  This emphasis comes 
at the expense of the dialogic or argumentative aspect of the “government 
treating ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”62  
Waldron and other scholars, including David Luban and Daniel Markovits, 
have therefore sought to give pride of place to litigation and adjudicative 
procedures as a means of manifesting respect for the self-determining agency 
of free and equal citizens.63  But relatively little has been said about decision-
making procedures within organizations generally, and the executive branch 
of government specifically, and how these procedures relate to democracy 
and human dignity.  Neal Katyal’s celebration of the virtues of bureaucracy 
offers a suggestion for how this connection can be drawn.  He observes that 
there are two competing sources of legitimacy within the executive branch—
political will and expertise.64  The president’s exercise of prerogatives such 
as pardoning and directing prosecutorial resources may be thought of as a 
manifestation of democratic energy; left unchecked, however, it becomes a 
source of arbitrary power.  Because the president’s prerogatives respond to 
considerations of democratic legitimacy, they should not be interfered with 
because of disagreement on policy grounds.  That was the point of the 
 
to revoke their security clearances. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Trump 
Revokes Ex-C.I.A. Director John Brennan’s Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/us/politics/john-brennan-security-clearance.html 
[https://perma.cc/QV5B-YVWU]. 
 59. FINNIS, supra note 13, at 335. 
 60. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Cornelia Pillard, 
Unitariness and Myopia:  The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 
1297 (2006). 
 61. Waldron, Procedure, supra note 7, at 21. 
 62. Id. at 22. 
 63. Id. at 23–24; see also DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When 
They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 65, 72–73 (2007) 
(arguing that respecting dignity requires presuming that litigants have a story to tell in good 
faith); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS:  ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 176–77, 180–87 (2008) (seeking to establish a connection between political 
legitimacy and the agency of citizens by relying on litigation to foster an effective engagement 
with democratic processes). 
 64. Katyal, supra note 60, at 2317. 
2019] DISCRETION MEETS LEGITIMACY 2009 
antitrust example:  the president is entitled to his or her own views about the 
enforcement of antitrust policy, provided, of course, that they are within the 
bounds of legally conferred discretion. 
The exercise of discretion must be rational in order to be legitimate.  As 
Hart writes in his essay on discretion: 
[I]t [is] not too much to say that decisions involving discretion are rational 
primarily because of the manner in which they are made, but of course the 
word “manner” here must be understood to include not only narrowly 
procedural factors and the deliberate exclusion of private interest, 
prejudice, and the use of experience in the field but also the determined 
effort to identify what are the various values which have to be considered 
and subjected in the course of discretion to some form of compromise or 
subordination.65 
The arguments supporting the exercise of discretion must be rational, even if 
not conclusive.66  Therefore, one of the fundamental obligations of a 
government lawyer serving in an advisory capacity is to identify competing 
values and subject them to a process of weighing, balancing, and 
compromise.  This process ensures that the resulting decision will not be one 
with which all observers will agree—otherwise there would be no room for 
the exercise of discretion—but will be one with respect to which an observer 
should be able to conclude, “[t]hat was a satisfactory compromise between 
different values.”67  Returning to the example of President Clinton’s pardon 
of Marc Rich, the pardon was arguably not based on “good and sufficient 
reasons,” not because of any policy preference revealed by the pardon, but 
because it did not represent a reasoned choice among the types of 
considerations that ought to bear on this exercise of discretion.  In an op-ed 
published in the New York Times, Clinton defended his decision by noting 
that others who had structured transactions in the same way had been sued 
civilly rather than being indicted and that Rich had acted on the advice of 
prominent tax experts.68  But this is a fairly thin reed since enforcement 
agencies often have the choice to pursue civil or criminal penalties.69  Given 
the allegations of a quid pro quo for Rich’s ex-wife’s campaign contributions, 
Clinton did not offer a particularly persuasive justification that appealed to 
the relevant values for his exercise of the pardon power.  Those values are 
generally believed to include moving beyond a time of particular social and 
political upheaval or controversy (for example, pardoning Vietnam-era draft 
evaders or President Ford’s pardon of President Nixon after the Watergate 
crisis to allow the nation to move beyond the controversy), rectifying past 
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injustices, or recognizing that someone has long since paid his debt to 
society.70  They do not include helping out one’s political allies. 
The crucial analytical work lies in the specification of which values bear 
on the exercise of discretion.  Consider as an example some of the factors 
listed in the Justice Manual (previously known as the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual), which pertain to another discretionary decision by government 
officials, namely, the decision to prosecute.  When deciding whether to bring 
criminal charges, lawyers for the government are directed to take account of 
factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the deterrent effect 
of prosecution, the culpability of the defendant, the defendant’s criminal 
history, and the impact of the offense on victims.71  Government attorneys 
are specifically prohibited from taking into account their own personal 
feelings or the defendant’s race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, sexual 
orientation, or political associations, activities, or beliefs.72  The Justice 
Manual is for the internal guidance of Justice Department lawyers, so it is 
not a source of positive law; the point, however, is that the considerations it 
identifies are values relating closely to the fair administration of a system of 
criminal justice.  The values that should guide discretion in the absence of 
constraint by positive law are those that would inform the deliberation of a 
rational decision maker, and what makes them rational is the belief that they 
would be considerations that could be accepted (or not reasonably rejected) 
from the point of view of those subject to official power.  The values may be 
political in the sense that they are contested in our society and the competing 
parties may align differently with respect to these values73—consider, again, 
the hypothetical of the lawyer who was horrified by the president’s populism 
and would have preferred a Chicago-school law-and-economics approach to 
antitrust policy.  It is essential, however, that these values bear on the exercise 
of power in the appropriate manner.  The analysis of the sufficiency of 
reasons given for the exercise of discretionary authority must take account of 
the relationship between the reasons and the purpose for which official power 
is exercised. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried to avoid turning this Essay into yet another call for some 
political institution to play a stabilizing role while President Trump crashes 
around like a bull in a china shop.  In an ordinary presidency, the nature of 
the reasons that must be given in support of a presidential pardon, or to justify 
the decision to commence an investigation or prosecution, would be an 
interesting jurisprudential puzzle, but of no real urgency.  The reason is that 
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well-functioning institutions incorporate procedures for vetting official 
decisions, subjecting them to some degree of adversarial testing, and 
resolving disagreements in good faith.  The result will usually be a reasoned 
decision and, when a discretionary act comes in for criticism, it is often the 
case that the usual procedures had broken down or were circumvented.74  One 
of the signal characteristics of the Trump administration is the president’s 
unconcern with ordinary vetting processes; Bob Woodward’s look inside the 
White House is only the latest account of decisions made impulsively and 
often delivered via Twitter, without adequate consideration of alternatives, 
which inevitably led to frantic scrambling by staffers to contain the damage 
or reverse the decision.75  Government lawyers have a significant role to play 
in guiding the exercise of official discretion in most presidential 
administrations.  That role is to ensure that the relevant values are given due 
consideration and the resulting decision represents a reasoned ranking or 
compromise among relevant factors.  In the present administration, however, 
lawyers may be spending more time doing damage control or trying to 
restrain the impulses of a president who seems to believe that governing is 
nothing more than issuing directives. 
 
 
 74. Significantly, the New York Times editors appended a note to President Clinton’s 
explanation of his reasons for pardoning Marc Rich.  Clinton said he had asked three 
Republican lawyers, Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, and Lewis Libby, to 
review the pardon application.  In fact, however, the three lawyers had not reviewed the 
application. See Clinton, supra note 68. 
 75. See Jill Abramson, Bob Woodward’s Meticulous, Frightening Look Inside the Trump 
White House, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/bob-
woodwards-meticulous-frightening-look-inside-the-trump-white-house/2018/09/06/b30ebc5 
e-b1e6-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html [https://perma.cc/TKU5-N9ML] (reporting on, 
among other events, Trump’s refusal to consider a memo setting out four options regarding 
military service by transgender people, his tweet proclaiming his decision to ban them, and 
the subsequent pushback by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of 
Defense). 
